Depot repair capacity as a criterion for transportation mode selection in the retrograde movement of reparable assets by Cunningham, William A et al.
Journal of Transportation Management
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 7
4-1-2004
Depot repair capacity as a criterion for
transportation mode selection in the retrograde
movement of reparable assets
William A. Cunningham
Air Force Institute of Technology
Stephen Swartz
Air Force Institute of Technology
Harold M. Kahler
Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command USAF
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jotm
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Transportation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Transportation Management by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Cunningham, William A., Swartz, Stephen & Kahler, Harold M. (2004). Depot repair capacity as a criterion for transportation mode
selection in the retrograde movement of reparable assets. Journal of Transportation Management, 15(1), 55-66. doi: 10.22237/jotm/
1080777960
DEPOT REPAIR CAPACITY AS A 
CRITERION FOR TRANSPORTATION 
MODE SELECTION IN THE RETROGRADE 
MOVEMENT OF REPARABLE ASSETS
William A. Cunningham 
Air Force Institute of Technology
Stephen Swartz
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Harold M. Kahler
Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command USAF
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Government.
ABSTRACT
To support smaller reparable asset inventories, current Air Force logistics policies direct the 
“expedited evacuation of reparables ... to the source of repair.” Mode selection is based on the 
asset. Focusing on the asset is an efficient and effective method of getting assets to where 
they are needed in a timely manner in the forward portion of the supply pipeline. However, 
in the reverse portion of the pipeline, the demand for an asset may no longer be critical to how 
it is transported. The quantity of the asset at the depot may already exceed repair capacity. 
In this instance, rapid movement results in the asset being added to the backlog already 
awaiting repair, thus retrograde modal selection focus should shift to repair capacity. Since 
the depots face budget and manning constraints and do not operate on a continuous basis, 
their repair capacity is limited. With finite repair resources, the question of when an asset 
can be repaired should be involved in mode determination. A stock-point modeling approach 
was used, with depot production requirements as a surrogate for demand in calculating 
shipping priority. Using Warner Robins Air Logistics Center reparable asset production data, 
this article illustrates potential savings in transportation that are possible utilizing an 
alternative factor in modal choice decision for the retrograde or reverse portion of the pipeline.
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INTRODUCTION
Air Force guidance on management and direction 
of the reparable item pipeline is primarily found 
in AFPD 20-3, Air Force Weapon System Repar­
able Asset Management (Department of the Air 
Force, 1998) and the Air Force instruction which 
implements this policy directive, AFI 21-129, 
Two Level Maintenance and Regional Repair of 
Air Force Weapon Systems and Equipment 
(Department of the Air Force, 1998). This 
guidance provides the scope of the reverse 
pipeline which,
begins when a weapons system reparable 
asset is removed from an end item, 
repaired or declared as NRTS (Not 
Repairable This Station) and concludes 
when the item has returned to the 
serviceable inventory (Department of the 
Air Force, 1998, p. 3).
This is a slightly expanded viewr of reverse 
logistics than is normally discussed, which ends 
when the item is returned to its point of origin. 
In AFPD 20-3, the Air Force expands the scope of 
retrograde logistics to include the repositioning 
of a newly-repaired asset. This guidance provides 
the basis for the reparable pipeline:
The objective of Air Force logistics is to 
maximize operational capability by using 
high velocity, time definite processes to 
manage mission and logistics uncertainty 
in lieu of large inventory levels— 
resulting in shorter cycle times, reduced 
inventories and cost, and a smaller mobil­
ity footprint (Department of the Air 
Force, 1998, p. 1).
The policy directive goes on to direct the 
“expedited evacuation of reparables by bases... to 
the source of repair” (Department of the Air 
Force, 1998, p. 1).
The most significant aspect of this guidance is 
that the Air Force pipeline is transportation- 
based. Air Force logistics relies on a time definite 
and expedited means of transportation instead of
inventory to counter variability. An Air Force 
Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) study 
described the rationale for this policy:
Air Force supply policies are closely 
linked to the use of premium transporta­
tion. The logic for these policies is based 
on the classic tradeoff between inventory 
investment and transportation costs... Air 
Force inventory policies are sensitive to 
transportation or pipeline times because 
inventory costs tend to be relatively high 
and transportation costs low (Masciulli, 
Boone, and Lyle, 2002, p. 2).
The Air Force’s transportation guidance, AFI 24- 
201, Cargo Movement, also reinforces this notion:
Increased transportation costs are offset 
by reduced inventory levels resulting in 
overall logistics savings and mission 
sustainment (Department of the Air 
Force, 1999, p. 9).
Transportation Mode Selection
Reliance on transportation to support lower 
inventory levels and faster cycle times places a 
premium on transportation mode selection. Vari­
ous authors have stated that the importance of 
transportation mode selection lays in its impact 
on a firm’s total logistics system (Stock and 
Lambert, 2001; Coyle, Bardi, and Novak, 2000; 
Liberatore and Miller, 1995; Sheffi, Eskandari, 
and Koutsopoulos, 1988). But more than that, it 
is the interaction and synergy between logistics 
activities that drive costs. Stock and Lambert 
state,
Effective management and real cost 
savings can be accomplished only by 
viewing logistics as an integrated system 
and minimizing its total cost given the 
firm’s customer service level (2001, p. 28).
The customer service level provided by a mode of 
transportation is the preeminent factor involved 
in mode choice. This is not to say that the goal is 
the highest level of service available. It is the
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optimal level of service that is desired, once 
other trade-offs have been considered. Stock and 
Lalonde, in a pre-deregulation study, found that 
service related variables, such as reliability, 
loss/damage, and total transit time, were most 
important (Stock and Lalonde, 1977, p. 57). For 
pre-deregulation this would have to be true, 
since price was not allowed to be utilized as a 
competitive weapon.
Other studies (McGinnis, 1990; Murphy and 
Hall, 1995) have shown this to be true after 
deregulation. Confirming this and broadening 
the scope to post-deregulation, McGinnis found 
that,
While post-deregulation literature 
suggests that shippers have placed 
greater emphasis on costs since 1980, 
shipper priorities have not changed 
fundamentally... (McGinnis, 1990, p. 17).
Murphy and Hill (1995), in their analysis using 
studies published in the early 1990’s demon­
strated that customer service was still the 
preeminent factor. However, costs have grown in 
importance during post-deregulation:
Shippers in the U.S. value reliability 
more highly than cost and other service 
variables in the freight transportation 
choice process... (Murphy and Hill, 1995,
P- 37).
The goal in modal choice decisions is to use the 
lowest cost transportation consistent with a given 
service level. The overwhelming driver of mode 
choice cited was customer service first, followed 
by an optimization of costs (Giese, 1995; Rau- 
tenberg, 1995; Coyle, et al, 2001; Stock and 
Lambert, 2001). However, costs must be con­
sidered. Quite a few authors make this point:
Freight rates are an important variable 
that should not be ignored... (McGinnis, 
1990, p. 17).
Economic and resource constraints man­
date that organizations make the most
efficient and productive mode and carrier 
choice decisions possible (Stock and 
Lambert, 2001, p. 355).
When costs are considered, freight cost should 
not be analyzed in isolation. Coyle, Bardi, and 
Novak (2001) note that failure to consider the 
total picture is hazardous. Simply selecting a low 
cost mode, while lowering transportation costs, 
may raise inventory or warehousing costs, and 
reduce customer service.
Air Force Transportation Mode Selection
The Air Force logistics system is transportation- 
based and relies on a time definite and expedited 
means of transportation instead of inventory to 
counter variability. This places a premium on 
effective mode selection. The applicable trans­
portation guidance in this area is found in three 
publications. The first is the Defense Transporta­
tion Regulation (DTR), Part 2 (Department of 
Defense, 2000). This document sets time stan­
dards and allows for expedited movement of 
cargo w hen needed. Second, AFI 24-201, Cargo 
Movement (Department of the Air Force, 1999), 
is the overarching Air Force transportation regu­
lation. Finally, Air Mobility Command Freight 
Traffic Rules, Publication Number 5 (AMC, 
1999), applies DoD transportation rules to all 
carriers hauling freight for the DoD. These three 
regulations cover the span of the movement of 
freight within the DoD and the Air Force. In 
addition to the transportation guidance, AFI 21- 
129, Two-level Maintenance and Regional Repair 
of Air Force Weapons Systems and Equipment 
(Department of the Air Force, 1998) states the 
following:
Traffic managers must ensure that 
reparable 2LM [two-level maintenance] 
items are evacuated as quickly as 
possible for shipment to repair activities. 
Shipment planners must make every 
effort to ship those assets the same day 
they are received from Supply or Main­
tenance organizations (Department of the 
Air Force, 1998, p. 11).
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From the guidance on reparable maintenance, 
instructions require that the NRTS asset be 
transported off base as quickly as possible. 
Further, regulations state that the reparable 
assets should be “moved using fast, time-definite 
best value transportation...” (Department of the 
Air Force, 1998, p. 11).
However, as one study of Air Force shipping 
policies states, “the definitive word comes from 
AFI 24-201” (Masciulli and Cunningham, 2001, 
p. 4). This transportation instruction provides 
Ar Force transportation managers with the 
direct guidance on selecting the mode of trans­
portation for a NRTS asset. Chapter 2 of AFI 
24-201 provides the concept of operations for 
transportation managers.
According to this document, all reparable items 
will be shipped using commercial express. 
Explicitly, the directive states:
Commercial air express small-package 
delivery service... is the norm for Agile 
Logistics/2LM/Rapid Parts Movement 
shipments to meet Air Force sustainment 
goals (Department of the Ar Force, 1999, 
p. 9-10).
It also sets a rigorous and compressed time 
standard of 24 hours from the time an item is 
declared NRTS by maintenance until it is pro­
cessed through supply to transportation and 
picked up by the carrier (Department of the Ar 
Force, 1999, p. 10). AFI 24-201 also states that 
the DoD is a mandatory user of the General Ser­
vices Administration small package express 
program. In other words, any item shipped by 
the DoD (and thus the Air Force), must be sent 
by express air. The exceptions to this are 
provided in paragraphs 6.1.1 through 6.1.5 of the 
instruction (Department of the Ar Force, 1999, 
p. 22). Three of the major exceptions include 
distances under 500 miles, contingency opera­
tions, and shipments over 151 pounds.
The overall Ar Force policy on transportation 
mode selection (for forward or retrograde 
movement of assets) is a fast, time-definite,
traceable means. Mode is not dictated (see also 
Kossow, 2003; Masciulli, et al., 2002; and Mas­
ciulli and Cunningham, 2001). However, as is 
seen in AFI 24-201, it may be specified in certain 
instances. For example, an individual shipment 
under 151 pounds and over 500 miles distant 
from origin will be sent via express air under the 
terms of the GSA small package express 
contract.
Masciulli and Cunningham (2001) analyzed Air 
Force Mission Capable (MICAP) part shipping 
policies and examined MICAP shipment data. 
They found that current Ar Force shipping poli­
cies are less than optimal from a cost standpoint 
(Masciulli and Cunningham, 2001, p. 4). Of par­
ticular interest is the heavy reliance on the use 
of premium, overnight air to ship items. The 
data used in this study had several examples of 
misuse of premium, overnight air, including a 
shipment that traveled a total of 11.4 miles. 
They raised the following question regarding this 
issue:
...is the use of FedEx so ingrained in the 
Ar Force and DoD corporate culture 
[that] it is automatically ... used as the 
carrier for MICAP items and other time- 
critical shipments without regard to cost, 
distance or other factors? (Masciulli and 
Cunningham, 2001, p. 7)
The problem with the current Air Force policies 
is that they seek to optimize the entire logistics 
pipeline by optimizing each individual segment 
in terms of transportation times. The reasoning 
is, if the part is shipped by the fastest mode in 
each segment, this will result in the fastest 
overall order cycle time. However, this view 
ignores the effects of bottlenecks in one segment 
that might affect other decisions in that segment 
or other segments, and is the antithesis of the 
systems approach to logistics management. 
Current Air Force reparable asset management 
policy calls for the expedited movement of 
reparables,
...using high velocity, time definite 
processes to manage mission and logistics
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uncertainty in lieu of large inventory 
levels... (Department of the Air Force, 
1998, p. 1).
In addition, Air Force transportation policy, 
while not dictating mode, further calls for the 
fast movement of reparable items (Department 
of the Air Force, 1999). This policy may focus 
inappropriately on the asset, rather than being 
contingent upon what is happening at the repair 
depot. The quantity of the asset at the depot may 
already exceed the depot repair capacity. In this 
instance, the rapid movement of an asset to the 
depot would result in the asset arriving and 
being added to the backlog of items awaiting 
repair. This would be an inefficient use of 
transportation resources.
ANALYSIS
This article examines the use of depot capacity 
as a determinant of retrograde mode selection. 
No previous studies were found that incorpor­
ated the use of receiver capacity to process (by 
repairing or otherwise modifying) the item 
shipped as a determinant in mode selection. In 
this study, the required transportation service 
level will be determined by what is occurring at 
the depot. The quantity of assets at the depot 
and the depot repair capacity are used to 
determine what service level is required and, 
where this level could be provided by a lower cost 
mode, potential cost savings are calculated.
Supply Data
The supply data were obtained from the depot 
wholesale and retail receiving and shipping data­
base. The data include two measurements per 
month from January to July 2002. The depot 
pipeline data needed from these measurements 
are the quantities of each national shipping 
number (NSN) that are in the depot pipeline and 
are physically at the depot.
Also needed is depot capacity. However, depot 
capacity data could not be obtained from the air 
logistics centers (ALC). The Oklahoma City ALC
responded to a request for capacity data with the 
following:
As we operate today, capacity is a very, 
very rough cut determination ... capacity 
requirements planning at the rough cut 
level may indicate sufficient capacity 
exists to execute a master production 
schedule only to find at the micro level 
(close to or at the time of production) that 
capacity is insufficient ... there are too 
many variables surrounding the determi­
nation of shop capacity to make any kind 
of reliable statement concerning the mode 
of shipment based on capacity data 
(Oklahoma City, ALC, 2004).
The other depots confirmed this, describing shop 
capacity as a “floating” or “running” figure based 
upon budget, manning, and equipment. There­
fore, a surrogate measure for depot capacity was 
developed.
Depot Capacity and Induction 
Requirements
In order to determine the shipment priority of a 
reparable item back to the depot repair station, 
the time sensitivity of the shipment must be 
established. The repair schedule, a combination 
of depot capacity and funded repair authoriza­
tions, determines the monthly requirement for 
the numbers of items to be inducted for repair. A 
stock point model approach was used to deter­
mine time sensitivity. The sensitivity is based 
upon shipping mode selection in order to prevent 
“stocking out” of items for induction.
The stock point model approach is based upon 
maintaining sufficient stocks of an item of inven­
tory in order to ensure an acceptable level of risk 
of having insufficient inventory to meet demand. In 
this application, demand is the need for repar­
able assets to induct for a given production cycle. 
If the number of such items at the beginning of 
a production period is already sufficient to meet 
all of the induction needs for that period, then no 
shipment is required. If there are insufficient
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items to meet the production need, then 
shipments must be scheduled in order to provide 
items ahead of need in order to assume a limited 
risk of stocking out.
In this research, the induction needs of the depot 
repair shop were treated as the “customer 
demands” for the stock point model. Actual depot 
capacity sets an upper bound for the number of 
items that could be repaired in any monthly 
period. While the lower bound for any period is 
zero, the funded allocation of repairs per month 
over the annual budget cycle would set a 
practical average level of induction in any period. 
While information on actual depot capacity (up­
per bound) was not available, actual production 
counts (demands) were available from historical 
records.
Depot production data were acquired from 
Warner Robins ALC. Actual monthly production 
quantities of national shipping numbers (NSN’s) 
produced by repair shops at Warner Robins from 
October 2000 to December 2003 (less missing 
data for April 2002) for approximately 5,500 
NSN’s were obtained from historical records. 
Using Microsoft Access, these files were joined 
together to yield a sample of NSN’s with non­
zero production counts in each month. Descrip­
tive statistics were calculated for these items to 
compare against depot stock. While all data 
samples did not strictly adhere to a theoretical 
normal distribution, the data were sufficiently 
symmetrical and mound-shaped, and the 
samples large enough, to apply the central limit 
theorem. Under the application of the stock point 
modeling technique, this data represented 
“customer demand” for the purpose of calculating 
risk of stockout and time sensitivity of resupply.
Transportation Data
Transportation data came from Headquarters, 
Air Force Materiel Command’s Logistic Support 
Office (LSO), and the D087T, “Tracker” data­
base. The transportation data required consisted 
of the trip information and cost data. In addition 
to actual transportation data, information on an
alternate transportation mode is needed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of mode selection.
Methodology
Since only Warner Robins ALC provided produc­
tion data, the pool of NSN’s is limited to those 
for which this center is either the source of 
repair (SOR) or source of supply (SOS). To en­
sure 30 or more observations, only those NSN’s 
that were in all three years of the monthly 
production data were used. These NSN’s serve as 
a filter for the transportation data. NSN’s having 
fewer than two shipments (air or ground) were 
also excluded. Of the NSN’s remaining, only 
those with eleven or more shipments were used 
in this study.
Once the sample was obtained, the methodology 
became fairly simple in nature. The intent was to 
evaluate the efficacy of the modal choice made. 
Throughout the analysis, it involved comparing 
the depot stock (consisting of condition code F 
reparable items in depot supply and those in 
transit to the depot repair shop from depot 
supply) with the depot production averages 
calculated from the Warner Robins ALC produc­
tion data. For this model, if the depot stock is 
greater than the average monthly production, 
plus three standard deviations for a given repar­
able asset, the asset can be sent by the least cost 
method. This test was performed on all 3,189 
NSN’s. Because 14 different production data files 
were available, each NSN was evaluated for 
efficiency of modal selection 14 times.
The use of + 3(7 was decided upon because 99.7 
percent of all measurements fall within three 
standard deviations of the mean. Since, for the 
purposes of this study, only the right tail of the 
distribution is relevant, 99.85 percent (virtually 
all occurrences) of the time the depot repair shop 
production rate will be less than (! + 3O.
The final step is to calculate a potential savings 
figure using an alternate mode (in this study 
FedEx ground shipments) for shipments that 
passed the above mentioned test (fi + 3(7). Of the
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NSN’s remaining after the paring is accom­
plished, a random sample of 35 NSN’s were se­
lected to calculate this cost saving. In Microsoft 
Access, the results of the modal tests and the 
transportation data were linked in a query that 
filtered for shipments of the 35 randomly 
selected NSN’s and for the given date of the 
production data file, then screened out those that 
failed the test.
A significant number of transportation records 
were missing the actual cost data. Due to this 
fact, the 2004 FedEx government domestic 
express rate for standard overnight shipments 
was used for the cost of the shipments. The 2004 
FedEx government rates for two and three day 
rates and the FedEx standard commercial 
ground shipment rates were used to calculate the 
savings gained by going with a slower mode, and 
the percentage saved over standard overnight 
rates was also calculated. The difference in cost 
between the mode used and the alternate mode, 
multiplied by the number that could be shipped 
using a least cost approach, gives the total 
potential savings. In order to ascertain what 
these savings might constitute when projected 
over the entire set of repaired NSN’s, the savings 
from the random sample to the population were 
extrapolated.
Transportation Mode Evaluation
Once the sample was obtained, the ability to ship 
via a slower or lower cost mode was evaluated. 
The depot stock figure, consisting of the sum of 
condition code F items in depot supply, and those 
in transit from depot supply to the repair shop, 
was calculated for all 3,189 NSN’s for all 14 of 
the production data files and compared with the 
average monthly production, plus three standard 
deviations. Table 1 displays the results of this 
comparison by sample size.
Potential Sav ings
After obtaining the results of the modal evalua­
tion analysis, the data were filtered for those 
shipments on the dates of the production data 
files from the 35 NSN’s whose depot stock
allowed for slower transportation. A total of 34 of 
the 35 sample NSN’s had at least one occasion of 
depot stock exceeding the production rate. These 
NSN’s had a total of 114 shipments on the dates 
of the 14 data files. The calculation of savings is 
provided in Table 2.
Calculating what that savings might constitute 
when extrapolated over the entire set of re­
paired NSN’s was accomplished by assuming 
that the savings of a larger sample is propor­
tional to the relative sizes of the two samples. 
Table 3 shows the results of this extrapolation.
Recall that this figure is only for 14 days, 
assuming the ratios hold throughout. Annual 
savings would be derived by dividing the savings 
figure by the ratio of 14/250 (assuming no 
shipments on weekends or federal holidays). 
Annualized extrapolation would yield savings of 
$102,055,053.87 for all NSN’s and $38,771,413.33 
for those managed by Warner Robins ALC. A 
simple “back of the napkin” sensitivity analysis
Table 1
Results of Modal Evaluation
Sample Trials Success %
35 490 410 83.7
213 2,982 2,585 86.7
593 8,302 6,283 75.7
3,189 44,646 24,189 54.2
TABLE 2
SAVINGS FROM ALTERNATIVE MODE




















Sample Size Ratio Savings ($)
Total Repair NSN’s 133,538 5,715,083.02
WR ALC NSN’s 50,732 0.380 2,171,199.15
NSN’s with Production Data 3,189 0.063 136,481.00
NSN’s with Activity 593 0.186 25,378.88
213 >11 ships 213 0.359 9,115.85
Random Sample 35 0.164 1,497.91
*This assumes the ratios hold throughout
illustrates that, even if the results of the inter­
polation were off by 90 percent, substantial sav­
ings would result from a modal selection process 
that utilized depot capacity and on-hand inven­
tory as decision criteria.
RESULTS
This research addressed the basis for Air Force 
transportation mode selection in the retrograde 
movement of reparable assets. Air Force inven­
tory policy is transportation-based, offsetting the 
increased transportation costs with lower 
inventory expenses. Overall policy directs ship­
ment by a fast, time-definite and traceable 
means. While in general mode is not directed, in 
the review of Air Force policy, it was shown that 
certain supply and transportation policies, such 
as Agile Logistics, Two-Level Maintenance and 
Rapid Parts Movement required fast movement 
of reparable items in those categories. According 
to one study of this process, most often this 
means that an NRTS asset is shipped via pre­
mium air transportation (Masciulli, Boone, and 
Lyle, 2002).
The literature review has shown the focus of Ar 
Force modal selection to be on the asset, its type 
and the current demand for it. While these are 
important in mode selection, in the reverse 
portion of the logistics pipeline, using these to 
determine the shipment mode omits a critical 
factor affecting this decision. This factor is the
limited or finite repair capacity at repair depots. 
The fact that there is a finite repair capacity 
should be the major determinant in how an asset 
is shipped. Otherwise, if the depot has a suffi­
cient quantity to work on (for this study a one 
month supply was considered sufficient), after 
express shipping the asset to the depot, it will 
just sit and await repair. This produces a 
situation analogous to our military’s notorious 
penchant for “hurry up and wait.” In addition, 
this also results in the over-expenditure of a 
significant amount of resources for premium air 
when a slower, cheaper mode would have suf­
ficed.
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Transportation Command’s Strategic 
Distribution program guidance states,
Improved retrograde of valuable, repair­
able stock to service maintenance depots, 
synchronized with depot repair schedules, 
has enormous potential in areas of readi­
ness, reduced inventories, and long-term 
cost savings (USTRANSCOM, 2003, p. 15).
While reverse logistics and synchronization may 
not seem directly germane to transportation 
mode selection, it is essential that mode selection 
not be made in a vacuum. The entire system 
must be considered. As Stock and Lambert put 
it,
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effective management and real cost 
savings can be accomplished only by 
viewing logistics as an integrated system 
and minimizing its total cost given the 
firm’s customer service level (2001, p. 29).
Part of this systemic view entails taking into 
account what is happening upstream at the 
source of supply and repair. This research 
queried whether depot repair capacity should be 
a factor in retrograde transportation mode selec­
tion. The results make the answer to this 
question an emphatic yes. The high percentage 
of “passes” (incidences of depot stock being 
greater than depot production) indicates that the 
depot has more than enough to wrork on. For 
these items, shipment by premium air (standard 
overnight service) will not result in efficient 
induction, repair and return to using bases. 
Rather it will mean their addition to the assets 
already awaiting induction for repair.
Implicit in Air Force reliance on fast transporta­
tion to offset smaller inventories is that this 
tradeoff has to be made. It should follow that the 
depot should be dependent upon fast shipment to 
maintain production. While this methodology 
presented depot stock as being greater than pro­
duction rate as a “pass” or “success,” it actually 
represents a failure of the logistics system to 
successfully make the tradeoff between inventory 
and transportation. In those instances, a part was 
either sent too fast or a point where the Air 
Force possessed too much inventory was ldenti-
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